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Speech of Senator
For Release --

Mi~e

Mansfield {D•, Montana)

BEYOND FORMOSA

During l'Cccnt years the United States has been confronted with a suecession of crises in Asia.
now face in Formosa.

None has been

mor~

complex than the one which we

I should like to begin this discussion therefore by review-

ing the background of our present involvement in that region.
When the Chinese Communists came to power on the mainland in 1949,
the government of the Republic of China moved to Formosa.

The United States

continued to recognize that government and only that government.

Since the

outbreak of communist aggression in Korea, almost five years ago, our
military forces have been committed to preventing the Chinese Communists from
seizing Formosa.

This policy, instituted by former President Truman, has had

the continuing support of Congress.

It has also had the overwhelming support of

both great political parties.
Last ye1'!.r, in December, the Secretary of State concluded a defense
treaty with the Republic of China which had the effect of formally acknowledging
this policy.

For some reason, which in my opinion has never been satisfactorily

explained, the President saw fit not to wait for the Senate's consent to ratification
of that treaty.

Instead, in the interim, he sent to the Congress a joint resolution

on the Defense of Formosa.

The resolution neither added to nor subtracted from

the terms of the defense treaty which was subsequently ratified.
In debating the Formosa Resolution in the Senate there was no question
of the determination of that body that Formosa should be defended.

That was
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never at issue .

The debate, rather, centered on two other questions.

"'ne was

the question of whether Congress should endorse in advance a possible American
military action in the Fo!"mosan Straits and on the Chinese mainland, nets over
which Congress could have no control and the validity of which it could have no
way of determining.

1 stated at the time that in my judgment under the Constitu-

tion only Ccngres s had the power to declare war but that short of war the
President had powers to act as Commander-in-Chief and in the execution of
foreign policy.

1 further stated that his powers and his r esponsiDility in the

latter connection could not be diluted, obscured, trander red, or divided,
resolutions of Congress to the contrary notwithstanding.

After the P resident

gave assurances, in effect, that he alone would assume responnibility for any use_
of force in the Formosan region, without a de:::laration o f wa r, the resolution wa
accepted by the Senate .

Had we not had thuse Presidential assurances, that

resolution would have been an open invitation to irresponsibility and might very
well have been rejected by the .3enate.
The second side-issue in the Formosan debate was the relation of the
coastal islands of the Quemoys and the 1Viatsus to the safeguarding of Formosa.
In this discussion the Senate was atte Mpting to place the defense of the coastal
islands -- in the perspective of our national interests rather than those of the
Chinese nationalist government,

In consequence, it was clear by the time the

resolution paused that Congress supported the defense of Formosa and nothing
more.

We were nut approving any military crusade on the mainland o£ Asia o r

any defense of the off -shore islands for the sake of the o ff-shore islands.

T

!<.now
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that my own vote was cast with that understanding and I so stated.

Many other

members of the Senate expressed similar sentiments.
The responsibility for carrying out the defense of Formosa -- and it is
a heavy burden -- remains the responsibility of the President. It seems to me
that the best way that Americans can lighten that burden is by refraining at this
time from attempts to whittle away at his responsibility.
entrusted with the defense of Formosa.

The President is

It is for him to decide whether to defend

the coastal islands or to engage our forces in their defense.

He is accountable

to the American people for whatever action he may or may not take.

But to

attempt to tie his hands now, in advance, either for or against their defense,
will serve only to deepen the difficult crisis in which we find ourselves.
It is unfortunate, in my opinion, that

~he

Formosan resolution, if it

had to come to Congress at all, came in the vague fashion that it did.

Once

having been made public, however, Congress was faced with little alternative
but to accept it in that form or weaken the President's position in dealing with
the Far Eastern crisis.
My concern today is not with predicting the outcome of the Formosan
crisis. I do not know whether the vagueness of our position on the coastal
islands will either avert war or plunge us into war.
ful prediction of that kind.

No one can make a meaning-

I believe that remains the case despite the growing

prospects of peace talks between the United States and the Communists.
talks, in my opinion, should not be ruled out but they should he
the greatest caution,

These

~pproached

•vitll
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I would address the main body of my remarks today to the proposition
that the difficult situation in which we find ourselves, respecting the Cuemoya an
the Matsus is merely an external symptom of our problems in the Far East.

Th<

underlying causes fo r these problems are to be found in fo rces and pressures
which exist inside the body of Asia.

They are also to be found in pressures and

forces which are exerted from outside .Asia.

If there is to be peace in that part

of the world - - if there are to be long - term solutions in As ia, it is to these
causes that our attention must be turned.

It is of importance that we understand

not only what these forces are but what happens in Asia when the pressures from
outside the Continent collide with those from within.

In particular it is of im-

portance that the role of military force in our policy in Asia be examined -- not
so much from the standpoint of its use as an ultimate recourse in war but its
role as a deterrent before war breaks out.

That is the way we have been called

upon to use it, except in Korea, since the end of Vlorld War II.
The crisis in the Formosan Straits is not an isolated incident.

It is

part of a chain teaction identified with last year's crisis in Indochina and before
that with the crisis in Korea.

In dealing with the crisis in Formosa our attention

is easily diverted from developments which next year may result in a crisis in
Laos, Thailand and Indonesia.

By the following year, if not sooner, the crisis

of Japan may be full upon us.
The inter -related problems in Asia include the conspicuous threats of
communist territorial expansion , in Korea, Indochina, and Formosa.
interwoven,

howev~r,

wit:}'

1 CPs -evirief't

tht'eats .

The,..~

;

Q

It also is

pr"!BBurc witHn Japar
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for an expansion of trade,

To the extent that this pressure seeks an outlet in

closer economic and cultural relations with the Chinese mainland, it affects
the unity of policy among members of the free world with respect to Communist
China.

There is also a mounting pres sure among the so-called neutral states

of South Asia for peaceful relations with Communist China.

The attitude of

these states towards developments in Formosa must be seen in the context of
that broader consideration.

In considering the totality of our situation in Asia,

moreover, we cannot ignore the possibility that the outbreak of hostilities in
the Chinese coastal islands could signalize a resumption of hostilities in Korea
and Indochina.

Finally, behind the complex of these factors in Asia we must

also reckon with the relationship between the actions of Communist China and
the policy of the Soviet Union,
During recent years we have been attempting to deal with these various
pressures largely by economic and military means and sometimes in a seemingly
disconnected fashion,
free countries of Asia.

We have contributed to the economic development of the
We have attempted at the same time to strengthen the

defenses of the free-Asian countries.
however, by the recurrent crises.

These positive efforts have been dimmed,

From the Korean crisis we rushed too late

to Indochina to quench a fire which had spread beyond control.
rushed to the fire in Formosa.

We now have

We may be blinded by the glare in Formosa to

the fire which is being kindled in Japan.

We have exercised in recent years a

kind of "chain reaction" diplomacy, a kind of crisis-foreign policy.
jumped from the effects of one crisis to its successor.

VIe have

We !1ave , in short, never

- 6 been ahead of the game.

That the crises continue to occur seerns to me evtdcnce

that either our positive measures have been insufficient or the situation has been
beyond our control by measures which we could support at that t1me.
is probably a little o f both .

1 thin tit

There arc limits to what we can do to control the

flow of events in Asia, short of war and even with war.
That does not mean our answer is to pick up our marbles and go homo.
Asia is too ir.1portant to us, to our security and to our other national interests
to permit that kind of response .

That would sir.1ply amount to poDtponing the day

of reckoning.
''le have n ot exhausted our possibilities of dealing with the situation
when we employ measures of economic aid and .nilitary aid.

It seems to me we

have ove rlookcd another which costs far less and yet can be .-·nore far- reaching
in its effect .
That ingredient I believe lies in the real r.1 of attitudes and ideas.

I an

not talking about psychological warfare which holds that you can win with tricky
words and slick advertising slogans battles which cannot be won with infantry
rifles.

I think the lesson of the unleashing of Chiang has put to rest that

fallacious concept .

But if the battle in Asia is essentially a struggle of ideas

it is in the spirit as well as in the economic and military arena wherein peace
and long tel'm solutions may possibly be found.
What I a :n suggesting is that we examine the Asian attitudes or states
of mind which give rise to many of the basic pressures with which we must

cf mind and our actions.
see 1.~ .

the peace we
power peace.

:?erhaps, then, we will find some of the answers to

Such answers will not lead to a purchased peace, or a

They could, however, lead to a peace based on mutual under-

standing and co mr.1on interest.

··re

have grown too accustomed to wrapping all the ills of Asia into the

single package mar!ced " r..1ilitant co-:n ;.-;1 unism".

Of course this threat exists;

we have seen over SOC m illion Chinese brought under the potential influence of
that ideolgy.

Countless millions r.,o re are threatened with it.

Y!e have spent

blood to prevent the conquest of Korea by c omm unist aggression.

Too late,

we saw Vietnam north of the 17th parallel brcught within the orbit of communism.
We have seen m ilitant co mmunist expansionis :I": acco mpanied by political
penetration, by organized propaganda, by the activities of disciplined cadres
of intimidators and by calculated economic penetration.

Military offensives

have been alternated with the allurements of the peace offensive with its offers
of trade, industrialization and cultural exchanges .

Today in Free Vietnam we

see Vietr:1inh agents using blac:cmail, bribery and intim idation in attempting to
undermine the Diem govern.tnent .

, '.'e see the Comr.-mnist created shadow govern -

ment of Fathet Lao in northern Laos and another

co ~-nm unist

penetration headed

by a for m er Premier of Thailand, Pridi, in Southeast P. sia. •:r e see the new
maps of China which brazenly incorporate territory fro m its southern neighbors.
We see new military highways under constructio n in south China.

In Indonesia

the Communist party has recently been reorganized and its activities accelerated.
The trade offensive directed at Japan is '.:> cginning to cause a wavering in that

• 8 country.

In North Korea the truce has been violated and the area has been

placed within a stranglehold of Communist control.
sword is pointed at Formosa.

And now, the Communist

It is all too e\'idcnt that militant communism

is a force in Asia.

But why, we may well ask ourselves, has it not met with

more resistance?

Why hasn't Asian nationalism which in great measure was

1timulated by our own revolution interposed a more formidable bulwark to the
communist advance?

\'le have assumed in recent years that by taking measures

to alleviate the extreme poverty of Asia, we might guide A sian nationalism
toward our own precepts of democracy.

We have also assumed that by arming

it heavily we could prevent a communist penetration.
been conspicuously successful.

These efforts have not

Perhaps, in part, the difficulty lies in the

failure to recognize the spiritual basis of Asian nationalism.
The peoples of Asia, looking out on the West , see the high material
standard of living which has followed in the wake of the industrial r evolution.
Asia was left in the backwash by the sweep of western industrialism.

The surge

of democracy which spread throug!l Europe and the Americas following our revo •
lution and the French Revolution by-passed Asia at that time.

In consequence, as

the decades passed the differences between eastern and western standards of liv·
ing widened, as did the gap between the political controllers and the controlled in
Asia.

For more than a century these differences burned deeper and deeper in the

hearts and minds of the peoples of the Orient.

The bitterness was fed not only by

the desire for the material achievements of the West but also by the dcm::mda of
pride and prestige.

Although the "#est brough:: so:ne benefit,;, the era of

- 9 -

colonialism was widely viewed in Asia as hampering the development of the
peoples of Asia in their own right.

Colonialism was backed by western force

and in the minds of many Asians, force is indelibly identified with their ancient
and deep-seated grievances against that system,
Although the era of colonialism is almost over in Asia, its after-effects
remain,

There is extreme sensitivity among Asians and especially among

Asian leaders about being recognized and dealt with on a basis of absolute
equality by the West.

There is an urge to express their new-found independence

in independent action,

An enthusiasm also exists for rapid economic develop-

ment --a desire to bridge the wide economic gap --between the East and West.
At the same time, however, dependence upon the V'est for economic aid contradicts the underlying urge of the Asian nations to prove their independence and
equality,

There exists most of all an ever-present sensitivity, an often

unreasonable sensitivity, to any action which resembles a return of the colonial
relationships of an earlier era.
In this context it is understandable that Communist China's defiance of
the West finds considerable emotional support from many Asians including
those who staunchly oppose co m munism.

It explains in part the support of some

Asian governm ents for the recognition of Communist China and for its admission
to the United Nations. It is an important element in explaining the initial
successes of the Vi.etminh in Indochina.

The deep-seated attitudes of Asia toward

the West form an emotional and psychological base which is readily exploited by
Communist propaganda,

An understanding of this fact is pertinent to any under-
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standing of the behavior of the uncommitted states of Ana, behavior which
sometimes appears and is hostile to us .
As Asians look at the West from these attitudes, and particularly o.s
they view the United States there is a tendency for many of them to interpret
present U. S. policy as a policy of force.

To them we exaggerate the value of

force.
And they identify force with the era of foreign domination in Asia against
which present Asian nationalism rebels.

When we announce a po licy of massive

retaliation it places force in the forefront rather than in the position of an
ultimate recourse where it should rightly be,

In the minds of many people

throughout Asia our emphasis on force rules out of the foreground the normal
and accepted processes of negotiation in human relations.
dignity and our prestige .

It undermines our

For the mightiest power on the face of the earth to

flaunt its strength in this manner is readily interpreted in Asia in the light of a
man who threatens to shoot his neighbor, if the latter's cow comes into his
pasture rather than to discuss the problem of mending the fence.

To be su rc

the reactions vary in different parts of Asia but I think it is correct to say that
Asians in general, including the Chinese people -- in spite of the recent
actions of their rulers -- are a peaceful people and they tend to admire the
strong who are also peaceful.

Much of the great respect which this country

enjoyed in the past derived from that fact: President Theodore Roosevelt's
admonition to "speak softly but carry a big stick" won us a great backlog of
goodwill in Asia.

This sensible advice seems to have been forgotten by a great

- 11 number of Americans who otherwise have every cause to admire Theodore
Roosevelt.
Those who know the peoples of Asia can attest to the great emphasis
which they place on negotiation.

A spirit of negotiation permeates their everyday

life; it involves adjustments and give-and-take and inevitably is accompanied by
prolonged discussion.

Those who know Asia will also attest to the lack of the

visible use of force in the everyday relations among Asians .
Closely related is a concept found in many parts of Asia which in effect
holds that there is a positive force in a negative action.

We see this in the

philosophy of Chinese Taoism - - we see it in what often appears to us to be the
retiring or reticent traits of many Asian peoples -- we see it in the Chinese
concept employed even by the Chinese Communists, of "advancing by withdrawing"
-- we have seen it in India in the passive resistance doctrine of Mahatma Gandhi.
It is reflected now in the arguments of the Asian neutrals .

We see it in the

Jiu Jitsu sport and the doctrine of Judo in Japan in which one utilizes the offensive
force of his opponent to his own advantage.

There are , of course, counter-

doctrines in Asia which place great emphasis on force, and we should not forget
them, but examples serve to illustrate an attitude which is of the highest
importance in understanding the international policies of the Asian nations.
The mention of the possible use of atomic tactical weapons in the
defense of Formosa is often interpreted there as further evidence of United States
reliance on force.

Instead of enhancing the strength of our position it has the

eHcct o! an admissi.on that we are incapable o!

copin~ w~th

..l,.,. qituation on a

- 12 plane of reason and have been driven m the fast round

to

dependence upon an

ultimate recourse.
I:f there is any one factor responsible for di a agreement m our relation•

with India, Burma, Indonesia and Ceylon it is lhe view of U1eir leaders that
primary reliance on force is not the best means of gaining solutions in Asia.
They advance the view that we can prevent communist aggression but
m

preventing the aggression it is not necessary to exercise pressures which

rule out a climate of negotiation.

We may find this attitude unrealistic and in

some cases, I believe, correctly so.

What is important, however, is to recog-

nize its existence and, if we are not intent upon isolating ourselves, to accommodate our policies, wherever possible, to it.
about it or losing our temper over it.

There is no sense in getting furious

To do so may give us a momentary sense

of satisfaction but it is not going to serve our national interests.
Most Asian nations acquiesced in the action of the United States in
neutralizing the Formosa Straits at the beginning of the Korean War.

At the

beginning of 1953, however, neutralization was replaced by a boastful policy of
"unleashing" the Chinese nationalist forces.

'\'ith few exceptions this second

step was interpreted by the free states of Asia as provocative -- as putting the
United States in position of reliance on force to the exclusion of other means.
' '/hat then should be the role of force in our policy in Asia?

We know

that in all realism no great power, least of all the United States, can afford at
present to abandon or weaken its military power.
"£ military alli;,.nc:ee

;~

We must continue the system

thP ""''ester~ Pt\.-:Hir. Southe:ut A•ia anti

t'h•

"1.-!ar EAst.
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Let us by all means continue to naintain and strengthen our military defenses
in the Far East.

Is it not however in the interest of peace in Asia, and in our

own national interest, that we relegate the use of force to the background? Is it
not in our interest to explore measures which offer some hope of leading to longterm solutions? Are there measures which will obtain these solutions? I believe
there are.
As a first measure it seems to me eo sential that we keep clearly in mind
that our national interest in the Formosan area is the defense of Formosa and
the Pescadores not that of the off- shore islands of the Quemoys and the Mats us.
Any defense of the coastal islands, which always have been a part of China and
so involved in the Chinese civil war is incidental to our primary aim.

President

Eisenhower, in submitting the Formosa resolution to Congress, only hinted at a
possible defense of the coastal islands while urging that a cease-fire be
negotiated.

That should remain our immediate objective and there are signs

now that we may be moving towards its achievement.
VTe cannot fail to recognize in this situation that threats to peace are
posed by the Chinese on both sides of the Formosa Straits .

The Republic of

China on Formosa has repeatedly avowed its intention of regaining the mainland.
The United States must come to grips with that threat since we are linked in a
defense alliance with the Republic.

Assuming that liberation of the mainland by

force were militarily feasible -- and it is not even conceivable short of commit ting this country to an all - out war on the continent of Asia -- would the peopl e of
the United States support the use of force as an instrument of national policy for

-

- 1

the hbcratlon of China? 1

thinl~

not.

Is 1t bC)'Ond our tmagtnatton to concch e

of Chma being ultimately !reed from totalitartan communum by other me n ?
Have we so little falth in the power of freedo n?
turned out their oppressors many times .

Is

1t

The Chinese people ho.ve

inconceivable that they wtll not

do so again?
The national gover•1ment of China deserves every reasonable consideration fro m this count1·y .

First considerntion must be given, however, to our

national needs and our needs arc not served by an embroilment in a war to
liberate the Chinese mainland .

I think it is time to recognize the tragic blunder

of "unleashing" Generalissimo Chiang Kai - shek and building up his expectations
that we would return him to the

~ainland .

That was a cruel and misleading thing

to do and I thin!< we ought to ac:mowlcdge the error .

I do not think we ought to

cor:1pound it,
Once we have returned to the policy of neutralization, the policy adopted
in 1950, we will have laid the groundwork for international action to counter the
threat of the Chinese communists .
The United States can then and only then, on sound moral and legal
grounds, insist that other free nations join with us in opposition to the use of any
aggressive force in the Fo r mosa area .

Such a declaration made perhaps by the

United Nations Assembly could call on both the Chinese Communists and the
Nationalists to abstain from the use of force .

Once our own purposes arc clear,

I believe that many, if not most countries outsic!e the Communist bloc v.ould
support a declaration condemning an attack by either side in the Chinese t:onGic t.
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Such a declaration would unite those nations who now oppose Communist military
action against Formosa but who are unwilling to give either moral or actual
support to the defense of the island so l ong as the Chinese national government
continues to threaten to invade the mainland.

Such a declaration having been

made, the question of the defense of the coastal islands would become a question
for international determination. It would no longer be a responsibility for the
President of the United States alone.

By taking this action the peoples of Asia

would be given a clear and forthright commitment that our position respecting
Formosa involved resort to force not in a trigger-happy fashion but force as a
last recourse.

At the sam e time, we would not have budged one inch in our

determination to prevent Communist seizure of Formosa.
Neutralization of the Straits, however important, is only a first
positive step toward a solution of the problem of Formosa.

A determination of

the status of Formosa is complicated not only by questions of international law
but by considerations contained in the regrettable but realistic fact that the
Republic of China on Formosa is not now and short of total war has little hope of
becoming the government of the mainland of China .

So long as two Chinese

governments, one on Formosa and one on the mainland claim jurisdiction over
all of China, there exists not only civil wa1· but a threat to world peace - - the
seeds of total war.
A number of possible solutions to this problem have been advanced.

The

establishment of an independent republic on Formosa by declaration of thP. present
governmen~

wonlrJ be realistic but is not a likel:r rlP.velopment.

~

?lE.biscite of

- 16 the people of Formosa has been suggcste8 to determine then
matter.

ishes m thu

Further proposals have been made to the effect that Formosa be

placed under a trusteeship with its integrity guaranteed for a d signated period
of years.

These envisage a trusteeship either by a single Pacific nation, by a

consortium of powers or by the United Natio ns.

In addition to these proposals

there are undoubtedly solutions as yet unexplored.

All such proposals require

patient and thorough examination.
A settlement of the status of Formosa would permit our full energies
to be directed toward the many pro blems of our peaceful relations with the
Asian nations.

For many years now we have thought of the world as being

divided into two parts -- the Free V'orld and the Communist World.
words have become a part of our everyday larguage.

These

Yet we arc now coming to

recognize the width and depth of the chasm which exists within the free world.
There is a gulf which may be of greater long-range significance than the
immediate threat of communism.

In terms of economics the gulf is between

those states which have a high material standard of living and those which are
struggling to rise from the level of recurrent fa rtline; it is an abyss which
separates automation fro :-n the man-drawn plow.
It is not enough that we build a wall to contain communism, for while

we build the wall the chasms within the free world deepen.

I am suggesting that

we continue to maintain our defense system in the Far East but that in the foreground our energy and

"nt~l\Pct

anrl t"esourccs !.>e di.,.Prted toward

bridges acl'os s the chasms in the free world.

buil~ing

.-
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It will take more than what we now call technical assistance and

economic aid.

If the gap is to be bridged the concept of "aid" must be replaced

by a unity of purpose .

The challenge is to move into spheres of economic and

cultural cooperation in which the common progress of all free nations becomes
possible. If we are equal to that challenge, and if we have the patience and understanding to stay with it, we need have no fear of the outcome of this contes t
between totalitarian communism and freedom - - in Asia, in Europe or anywhe r e
else.

